Valid and invalid causal arguments for physicalism

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Autor/in:
Erscheinungsjahr:
2024
Medientyp:
Text
Schlagworte:
  • Causal exclusion arguments
  • Dualism
  • Mental causation
  • Physicalism
  • Sufficient causation
Beschreibung:
  • In “A Causal Argument for Physicalism”, Lei Zhong presents an argument for physicalism in general, that is, for the disjunction of reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism. Zhong’s argument attempts to show that mental properties are physically acceptable, that is, physical in a wide sense. The crucial assumption of the argument is that physically acceptable effects do not have both sufficient causes that are physically acceptable and simultaneous sufficient causes that are not physically acceptable. I argue that Zhong’s argument is invalid, because the mental can be causally relevant to physically acceptable effects while being neither physically acceptable nor causally sufficient for these effects. I present an alternative argument in the spirit of Zhong’s argument that omits the notion of sufficient causation. I argue that non-physicalists can also resist the alternative argument if they fine-tune their metaphysics of mind. © The Author(s) 2024.
Lizenz:
  • info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Quellsystem:
Forschungsinformationssystem der UHH
Interne Metadaten
Quelldatensatz
oai:www.edit.fis.uni-hamburg.de:publications/2751f74e-39a1-49d5-88a3-5c593d951030