ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Erscheinungsjahr:
2013
Medientyp:
Text
Beschreibung:
In this paper we analyze the impact of ratification uncertainty on the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We combine the literature on IEAs with the one on two-level games of ratification by incorporating uncertain preferences of the pivotal voter in the ratification stage. We find that ratification uncertainty which has an non-monotonic impact on the strength of the commitment and – depending on the model specification – on the participation threshold as well. Specifically, for increasing variance in the ratification the commitment level that is specified in the agreement first decreases, while for sufficiently large variance it again increases and returns to the level that is preferred by the negotiators.