When I began to write A Theory of Contestation in 2013, I wanted to test the waters for moreprogrammatic contestation research in international relations theory. This book is a shorterand more programmatic follow-up to an earlier book, The Invisible Constitution of Politics:Contested Norms and International Encounter,1 and the decision to write it was triggered by themotivation to rescue the concept of “contestation” from becoming meaningless. My concernwas that “the increasingly popular reference to ‘contestation’ comes at a loss of conceptualprecision.”2 By turning into a buzzword in the 2010s, the concept of contestation was in dangerof losing its analytical teeth. As A Theory of Contestation holds, the concept’s analytical utility lies in understanding the distinct meanings of contestation as both a social practice of merelyobjecting to norms (principles, rules, or values) by rejecting them or refusing to implement them, and as a mode of critique through critical engagement in a discourse about them. The book’s central conceptual contribution lies in developing and substantiating a dual focus on contestation both as a social activity and a mode of critique.3 The former is expressed through spontaneous social practices, routine legal practices, or the attribution of a variety of meanings to social science concepts, 4 while the latter is an object of normative political theory.5 The effort to link empirical practice and normative purpose distinguishes the book’s approach from others that tend to fall into either of these two camps. By relating the two themes, A Theory of Contestation conveys an immanent dialectic that is central to the book’s purpose as a criticalintervention into international relations 6 and a critical investigation of international relations theory.7
When I began to write A Theory of Contestation in 2013, I wanted to test the waters for moreprogrammatic contestation research in international relations theory. This book is a shorterand more programmatic follow-up to an earlier book, The Invisible Constitution of Politics:Contested Norms and International Encounter,1 and the decision to write it was triggered by themotivation to rescue the concept of “contestation” from becoming meaningless. My concernwas that “the increasingly popular reference to ‘contestation’ comes at a loss of conceptualprecision.”2 By turning into a buzzword in the 2010s, the concept of contestation was in dangerof losing its analytical teeth. As A Theory of Contestation holds, the concept’s analytical utility lies in understanding the distinct meanings of contestation as both a social practice of merelyobjecting to norms (principles, rules, or values) by rejecting them or refusing to implement them, and as a mode of critique through critical engagement in a discourse about them. The book’s central conceptual contribution lies in developing and substantiating a dual focus on contestation both as a social activity and a mode of critique.3 The former is expressed through spontaneous social practices, routine legal practices, or the attribution of a variety of meanings to social science concepts, 4 while the latter is an object of normative political theory.5 The effort to link empirical practice and normative purpose distinguishes the book’s approach from others that tend to fall into either of these two camps. By relating the two themes, A Theory of Contestation conveys an immanent dialectic that is central to the book’s purpose as a criticalintervention into international relations 6 and a critical investigation of international relations theory.7