The impact of managerial change on performance:the role of team heterogeneity

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Autor/in:
Erscheinungsjahr:
2016
Medientyp:
Text
Schlagworte:
  • CEO
  • Firm performance
  • Managerial discretion
  • Corporate Social Responsibility
  • Corporate Governance
  • Firms
  • CEO
  • Firm performance
  • Managerial discretion
  • Corporate Social Responsibility
  • Corporate Governance
  • Firms
Beschreibung:
  • When a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks, subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents. As a new manager is less well informed, management dismissals reinvigorate this tournament competition-but only in sufficiently homogeneous teams. We investigate this hypothesis using a large dataset on dismissals of soccer coaches, whose main task is indeed the selection of players. We find that dismissals enhance performance (only) in homogeneous teams. Moreover, we show that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession effects, which reconciles previous contradictory findings.
  • When a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks, subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents. As a new manager is less well informed, management dismissals reinvigorate this tournament competition-but only in sufficiently homogeneous teams. We investigate this hypothesis using a large dataset on dismissals of soccer coaches, whose main task is indeed the selection of players. We find that dismissals enhance performance (only) in homogeneous teams. Moreover, we show that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession effects, which reconciles previous contradictory findings.
Lizenz:
  • info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Quellsystem:
Forschungsinformationssystem der UHH

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oai:www.edit.fis.uni-hamburg.de:publications/3b62382b-7eaf-4ff3-a070-0c237acbe960