I defend the claim that, for Fichte, the absence of poverty as material deprivation (in a sense I specify) must be understood as a condition of possibility of a relation of recognition. This relation between poverty and recognition is different from Honneth’s view that the absence of poverty is one dimension of a relation of recognition. Honneth develops this view as a reaction to Fraser’s worry that theories of recognition, like Honneth’s, risk to downplay the material dimensions of justice. I use the debate Redistribution or Recognition? (2003) between Honneth and Fraser as a frame for my discussion of Fichte. My claim is based on an interpretation of the first part of Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right (1796). A relation of recognition, for Fichte, is a relation of right in which “each is to limit his freedom through the concept of the possibility of the other’s freedom, under the condition that the latter likewise limit his freedom through the freedom of the former”. I focus on three passages in the text that support my claim. From the first I gather that the ability (to recognize) of the recognizing party is conditioned upon them not suffering from poverty as material deprivation. From the second I conclude that also the to-be-recognized party must not suffer from poverty, in order to be recognizable. The third passage reveals that Fichte believed that the existence of a relation of right is conditioned upon the respect of an “original right” to bodily inviolability which, in turn, is not respected when one is deprived of the fulfilment of basic material needs. Finally, I discuss whether poverty must continuously be avoided, in order to enable a relation of recognition, and a lack of which basic material goods constitutes the relevant kind of poverty.