In line with his philosophical heroes, Augustine and Descartes, Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) held that thinkers are epistemically responsible agents: beings who can rightly be criticised if they form their beliefs based on poor evidence. Unlike Augustine and Descartes, however, Malebranche also subscribed to occasionalism, according to which God is the only true cause. In this chapter, I explain how Malebranche sought to reconcile his occasionalist world-view with our epistemic (and moral) responsibility. In particular, I examine how Malebranche adopted and modified Descartes’ voluntarist theory of judgment so as to consistently integrate it into his occasionalist framework. In doing so, I will suggest a novel interpretation of Malebranche’s theory of free will and point out that Malebranche’s theory of judgment anticipates important Fregean insights about the nature of judgment and negation.