In the Middle East missiles of all kinds are more prevalent, more frequently used, and more destabilizing than anywhere else in the world. In addition, some of the region’s actors have acquired sufficient technology and infrastructure from abroad and have the national human resources to develop and manufacture their own missiles – whether free-flying unguided rockets, ballistic and cruise missiles, or space launch vehicles (SLVs). At the same time, massive imports of those rockets and missiles as well as their materials, components, and complete systems continue apace. Consequently, the gradual transformation of the Middle East/Gulf into a Missile Free Zone (MFZ) is an ambitious and formidable task. The final goal of an MFZ would involve numerous (non-)governmental entities, dozens of operational sites, test ranges and manufacturing plants, hundreds of industrial enterprises, thousands of kilometres of porous borders, and tens of thousands of rockets and missiles. In a region riven with historical animosities, ethnic prejudice, and religious strife, this becomes an enormous challenge. The ultimate objective of an MFZ as well as the stepby-step approach towards its realization will hinge upon a system of effective verification measures. They are indispensable for providing the chronically suspicious protagonists with the necessary quantum of confidence/trust1 to assume that the other parties are willing to comply with the agreed-upon reduction steps and the MFZ itself. Yet the challenge is also a conceptual one, since the literature on Nuclear Weapon/Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zones (NWFZ/ WMDFZ)2 has largely ignored the verification issue as it relates to missiles.3 Nevertheless, this article does not need to start from scratch, since the verification problem was part of regional arms control agreements in the 1970s. In addition, where helpful we will refer to those definitions, standards, and experiences that formed part of the concept of arms control during the East-West conflict. This contribution thus outlines the role of verification and its requirements, describes the potential and limits of existing technologies, and presents (mainly cooperative) verification
measures as necessary (yet limited) confidence-and security-building measures (CSBMs) on the incremental way to an MFZ. We conclude that the enormous challenges can adequately be met, but that satisfactory results which are politically acceptable to the relevant parties presuppose a readiness by all sides to embark on this long and bumpy journey.