Walking the talk in multiparty bargaining: An experimental investigation

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Autor/in:
Erscheinungsjahr:
2012
Medientyp:
Text
Schlagworte:
  • Bargaining
  • Communication
  • Fairness
  • Negotiations
Beschreibung:
  • We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two studies, we find that non-binding talk about fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on Competitive Reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that manipulated pre-game talk and spontaneous within-game dialogue lead to the same results. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
Lizenz:
  • info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
Quellsystem:
Forschungsinformationssystem der UHH
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Quelldatensatz
oai:www.edit.fis.uni-hamburg.de:publications/da7e8420-be77-491a-b377-8f8365e463de