While arms control verification nowadays refers to the verification of delivery vehicles, there seems to be fairly broad agreement that verification should include nuclear warheads andmilitary fissile material. Due to the sensitivity of information that could be gained from measuring these items, information barriers may likely be required. One type of system utilises the attribute approach: The inspected party would declare attributes that characterise the treaty accountable item to be authenticated. Criteria for proposing appropriate attributes are preventing leakage of sensitive information, minimising the possibility of cheating, robustness and a low complexity of measurements/analysis. Measurement issues that arise because inspectors may not know the configuration of the items and possible shielding must be understood as they introduce systematic uncertainties. Measurements of dismantled warhead components may be more reliable than measurements of fully assembled warheads where less information on shielding will likely be available. In any case, false positives and negatives should be as low as technically achievable. Procedures to cope with uncertainties are repeated measurements to deal with statistical uncertainties, measurements based on complementary measurement techniques to deal with systematic uncertainties and consultations between inspector and host. Despite remaining challenges, attribute information barriers may significantly add to the confidence in disarmamentwhen embedded in a web of additional verification measures.