Vera Shikhelman’s recent article on the implementation of the views of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) took a valuable first step towards addressing the question why states do, or do not, comply with adverse treaty body views. In this contribution, we contend that parts of the chosen theoretical and methodological approach are somewhat problematic, however, and ultimately weaken the overall strength and reliability of Shikhelman’s findings. Theoretically, we question whether hypotheses developed in the context of studying compliance with international law and legally binding court judgments can be transferred to legally non-binding views without adjusting for potentially consequential differences in their legal status. Methodologically, we note certain issues concerning the data generated by the HRC’s follow-up procedure and its use in Shikhelman’s analysis, and suggest that statistical methods that take into consideration the time dimension of implementation processes, notably survival analysis, yield analytically more convincing causal inferences. We provide illustrative results of such a methodologically revised approach to examining compliance with adverse HRC views that reveal more fine-grained insights into the temporally unfolding processes of implementing such decisions.