Hegel first introduces his concept of crime in the context of his theory of abstract right. While there is substantial disagreement in the literature about how exactly this concept is to be understood, most commentators agree that Hegel’s criminal necessarily violates the underlying normative principle of abstract right, the ‘commandment of right’. I question this consensus and propose an alternative interpretation according to which at least some crimes can arise even if no such violation occurs. I support this proposal by arguing that abstract right is underdetermined with respect to the principles governing the acquisition of property and by arguing that crimes should be understood as conflicts about which further specification of abstract right is to be considered valid. In his discussion of crime and punishment, Hegel therefore implicitly takes up the Kantian claim that property rights in a state of pure private law are only provisional in nature. Finally, I investigate some possible implications of this re-evaluation, in particular with respect to Hegel’s postulation of a ‘right of heroes’.
Hegel first introduces his concept of crime in the context of his theory of abstract right. While there is substantial disagreement in the literature about howexactly this concept is to be understood, most commentators agree that Hegel’s criminal necessarily violates the underlying normative principle of abstract right, the ‘commandment of right’. I question this consensus and propose an alternative interpretation according to which at least some crimes can arise even if no such violation occurs. I support this proposal by arguing that abstract right is underdetermined with respect to the principles governing the acquisition of property and by arguing that crimes should be understood as conflicts about which further specification of abstract right is to be considered valid. In his discussion of crime and punishment, Hegel therefore implicitly takes up the Kantian claim that property rights in a state of pure private law are only provisional in nature. Finally, I investigate some possible implications of this re-evaluation, in particular with respect to Hegel’s postulation of a ‘right of heroes’.